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Thestress of the two previous chapters was on the effects of recent Chilean
international economic regimes on her goods trade. In this chapter, the stress re
is shifted to the impact of the regimes on, first, services and transfers and then, fe
capital and gold flows.
a
SI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS n
11
i. The net balance from aggregate services was quite responsive to fl
changes in the regimes. In reaction to the systematic changes in the PLD-EERs
for nongoods transactions, noted earlier, this balance declined substantially
during more liberal periods and rose in more restrictive ones.
ii. Variations in service imports accounted for most of these reactions. V
In part this was because that import category was relatively responsive to U
policy changes. The partial-equilibrium price and OR elasticities for service 0
imports, for example, were higher than those for two-thirds of the imported
goods categories. That service imports were subjected to relatively great van- q
ations in policies was another factor. As a result, the relative variations in ser- C
vice imports were high in comparison with those for goods imports and for
service exports.
iii. The partial-equilibrium price responsiveness of service imports im- C
plies, ceteris paribus, that the demand for such imports increased 50percent
LI
in 1955—72 because of the secular fall of the PLD-EER. Thus, the exchange- e
rate policy added to balance-of-payments pressures.
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iv. Within a general-equilibrium framework, on the other hand, the direct
price responsiveness was almost swamped by the indirect effects. Quantitative
restrictions were much more effective for constraining short-run balance-of-
payments deficits than were price policies, given that exchange movements
were not neutralized.
v. Patterns were less clear for service imports on a more disaggregate
level. However, liberalization tended to increase deficits due to net outflows for
• freight, transportation, and income on direct investments. Increases were al-
towed in the last category even near the end of phases when other items were
restricted because of foreign-exchange shortages. In a sense, then, policies
favored foreign over domestic interests.
vi. Unilateral tranfers increased during liberalization attempts, primarily
because of enlarged inflows to the government. Such net inflows aided the lib-
eralization efforts, but never averaged as much as a quarter of the deficit on the
goods and services account.
vii. The totals of capital and gold inflows reveal that Chile was consis-
tently a debtor nation. Fluctuations in these totals, however, were not closely
phase-associated.
viii. The aggregate capital inflows to nonmonetary sectors, in contrast,
tress reflected the degree of liberalization. They increased in more liberal phases and
hen, fell in more restrictive ones. The causes of this phase association included direct
investment responses to specific policies and to the general economic climate
and private short-term capital movements due to these same factors and to
speculation. Net long-term private capital flows and net flows to the govern-
ment, on the other hand, were not closely phase-related; they were dominated
instead by the Alliance for Progress, political attitudes of the donor govern-
to ments, and repayment requirements.
ix. Net direct-investment inflows increased relative to net outflows from
ally income on such investments during the first two liberal phases and fell during
more restrictive periods. For the quarter-century following the Second World
)nS. War, however, the inflows averaged but 30 per cent of the outflows. Such fig-
to ures caused many Chileans to question the appropriateness of the distribution
of benefits from direct investment. p
ted x. Compensatory capital movements of considerable magnitude were re-
an- quired to sustain the first two liberalization programs. The resulting exhaustion
per- of reserves and of bank credit abroad led to their termination. The overvalued
NER could not be maintained for very long.
In the third liberalization attempt, in contrast, these movements were in the
opposite direction. The world copper market boom of the late 1 960s was the pri-
mary cause of this difference. The accumulated reserves, however, were quickly
exhausted under the Allende government because net capital outflows from





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section an attempt is made to answer three questions about services and (
transfersafter the Second World War. What were the patterns in constant.
dollar mean values for phases? Were there any within-phase regularities? V
Within a structural model how responsive were services to various policies?
t
8.1.1Mean Values for Phases.
Average constant-dollar values of all of the major components of the
Chilean balance of payments for phases and subphases in 1947—7 1 are pre-
sented in Table 8.1. The data in this table, together with others elsewhere in
the study, suggest, first, that in each of the three more liberal phases (i.e.,
1956—58, 1959—61, 1965—70), the mean net constant-dollar balance from all
services (Table 8.1, line A less line Al) declined from the level of the previous
phase. In two of the three more restrictive phases or subphases, the opposite
j. wastrue. The systematic reductions in discrimination against nongoods trans-
actions that accompanied liberalization (and vice versa) noted above (column
3 in Table 5.1 ),1thus,generally caused increased movements in the net bal-
ance from services. More careful examination of the data underlying Table 8.1
indicates that most of this variation was in the imports of services.2 Policy
changes affected the value of such imports much more strongly than they did
goods imports or goods or nongoods exports.3
The secular growth rate in 1947—65 for total services was the highest by
far among export categories and second only to transportation-related capital
goods among imports (column 1 in Table A.2). The value of these transac-
tions increased relatively rapidly over time, therefore, despite the fluctuations
due to phase changes. The only significant (at the 20 per cent level) phase-
coincident deviation from the secular growth rate is a decline for the 1962—64
Phase II years.
On a more disaggregate level, the relations between phases and mean
values are less consistent. In the 1956—58 liberalization, mean net flows fell
for every category except other services. In 1959—6 1 they fell for all but in-
vestment income and government. For 1965—70 they fell for all but travel,
freight, and other transportation.4
The pattern of outflows for investment income merits some comment.
These returns were largely from large-scale copper mining. For the phase im-
mediately after the Nuevo Trato of 1955, they increased somewhat. During the
liberalization of 1959—61 they fell by 6 per cent. In the 1965—70 liberalization,OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 203
however, their absolute value increased tremendously. The copper boom of the
late 1960s was a major factor in this bulge. The foreign owners reaped sub-
stantial returns from this boom despite the increase in Chilean participation
(see subsection 7.1.2.3).
For net flows from unrequited transfers, a phase-related pattern also pre-
vailed. On the average these inflows rose substantially in each of the three
more liberal periods. These increases originated primarily in enlarged transfers
to the central government. Changes in transfers to the private sector also were
important in 1956-58 and 1959—61. Such inflows helped facilitate the liberali-
zation efforts, although in none of these three attempts did they cover as much
as a quarter of the mean deficit on the goods and services account.
8.1.2Within-Phase Patterns.
in
• Carefulexamination of the annual data underlying Table 8.1 reveals some
p
all systematic patterns within phases. The aggregate deficit from net services rose
us at the start of each of the liberalization episodes. These increases originated
Ite predominately in higher freight and transportation payments resulting from
increased exports and in larger investment income outflows. Credits from
in travel usually grew enough, on the other hand, to offset increased deficits in
this category.
.1 In the last year of the first two more liberal phases, the deficit from aggre-
gate net services continued to grow. The primary contributing factor was the
id rising outflow for income on investment. The incentives for such outflows
were strong because of impending foreign-exchange crises. Despite the growing
foreign-exchange scarcities, however, the government did not effectively restrict
al these returns to foreigners. Instead it limited other items such as expenditures
on travel. In fact greater stringency—together with reduced goods exports—
is generally caused increases in net credits in the other categories. The expanded
outflow of investment income to foreigners, thus, was probably offset by net
4 reductions in other categories. In a sense, therefore, foreign interests were
favored over domestic ones.
ri Comparable data are not available for the last year of the third liberaliza-
11 tion attempt. The lack of an immediate foreign-exchange shortage, however,
probably resulted in different patterns. Expenditures on travel, for example,
apparently rose throughout most of 1970. Less because of policy stringency
than because of the ending of the worldwide boom in the copper market, out-
t. flows of investment income also fell.
At both the beginning and end of the more restrictive 1962—64 phase net
e debitsfor aggregate services declined. This again emphasizes the relative im-
• pact of greater restrictiveness on the service categories. Despite the over-all
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greater stringency, however, once again foreign investors were favored by
allowing larger outflows. tr
Enlarged net credits from unilateral transfers (especially to the central fr
government) helped facilitate liberalization at the start of the first two attempts. th
In the first case they continued to grow throughout the phase, but in the last sc
year of the second effort they fell off. In 1965, in contrast, such transfers sy
dropped. Subsequently they grew somewhat and then leveled off in 1968.
Under the Frei government, however, these inflows were definitely smaller Fl
than during the two previous liberalization attempts, reflecting a worldwide gr
shift in the form of aid flows from grants to loans, in
ti(
8.1.3Partial-Equilibrium Responses of Services.
SERVICE IMPORTS.
Relation 8.1 is for service imports (M8). The underlying model is the
same as is used for other imports in subsection 6.2.1: as
M8 =—43.7PLD-NER + 48.0 (8.1)
(2.5) (1.2)
[—0.8] [0.3]
+ 0.l05(X + M) —1,503QR + 1,366
(11.7) (3.4) (3.1)
[1.9] [—7.6]
0.92; SE =30.4;DW =2.5;years covered, 1947—65
Each of the same four sets of determinants is considered in turn.
The response to relative prices is fairly large. The elasticity with respect
to the PLD-NER is —0.8, which is greater than four of the six imported-goods
categories included in Table Ceteris paribus, this value implies that the 62
per cent fall in the brokers' PLD-NER between 1955 and 1972 induced an
expansion of almost 50 per cent in desired service imports. The attempt to
maintain increasingly overvalued exchange rates thus generated strong induce-
ments for imports in this category. On the other hand, such price responsive-
ness also suggests that price-related tools rather than QRs could have been 1
used to limit these imports. 0
The second term in relation 8.1 is the ratio of the current to the lagged
PLD-NER for the black market. It represents speculative pressures. The esti- tF
mate provides some evidence of a response in service imports to such pressures, P
but the relevant coefficient is significantly nonzero only at the 15 per cent P
level. The existence of a reaction to risk (as measured by the standard deviation P
of relative prices), in contrast, is not supported even at the 25 per cent level
of significance.OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 205
by The only important nonprice demand factor is the activity index for total
trade (X + M), which is included because imports of certain services (e.g.,
krai freight and insurance) depend upon it. The elasticity estimate of 1.9 implies
that such services are quite sensitive to the level of total trade. In contrast to
ast some of the consumer and intermediate goods categories, however, banking
system credit does not seem to have affected service imports directly.
68. On the other hand, the reaction to quantitative restrictions (QR, the
her Ffrench-Davis index) is significant and large. The elasticity of —7.6 implies a
ide greater response than for all but investment goods among the import categories
in Table 6.3. This supports the hypothesis made several times above (e.g., sec-
tion 5.1, subsection 8.1.1) that changes in the stringency of quantitative pol-
icies affected services relatively strongly. Great use of QRs to curb service
imports was required to offset the previously mentioned price response to the
overvalued NER.
the Finally, dominance of neither the habit-adjustment nor inventory effects,
as represented by lagged dependent variables, is supported by the results.
1) SERVICE EXPORTS.
Relation 8.2 is for service exports (X8):
23.3 PLD-NER_1+ 11.5 (X+M) (8.2)
(5.1) (4.9) (2.7)
[0.2] [0.0] [0.3]








e- =0.99;SE =9.1;DW =1.4;years covered, 1947—65
e-
The basic underlying model is the same as that used in subsection 7.2.1 for
other exports.
i. Although the response of exports of services to price policies is statis-
tically significant, the price elasticity is substantially smaller than that for im-
ports of services, and it is also smaller than the price elasticities for other ex-
ports (Table 6.2). The relatively limited reaction of service exports to price
policies is illustrated by the fact that this estimate implies only a 12 per cent
reduction in response to the 62 per cent decline in the relevant PLD-NER
for the 1956—72 period—in contrast to the almost 50 per cent increase in206 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
desired service imports noted above. The combination of these two elasticities, w
of course, still implies a considerable net response in services. If service ex-
ports and imports were in balance initially, for example, such a drop in the
PLD-NER would cause a deficit of over 60 per cent of the original level of
imports, ceteris paribus.
For both service exports and imports, no evidence exists of a significant
response to risks concerning future relative price movements. However, the
reaction to a Harberger [1963] accelerator term—the first difference of the
PLD-NER—is significant and large. This term represents (naive) anticipa-
tions regarding future changes in the PLD-NER.
ii.In contrast to all the other export categories included in Table 7.2,
quantitative supply factors have not directly limited service exports. This
result reflects the vagueness in capacity definitions for the service sector in
general, even though some components (e.g., tourist hotels) may have specific
capacity constraints. C
iii. Three significant quantitative demand factors are incorporated in the 0
regression. One is over-all trade (X + M), which represents the demand for
the Chilean provision of certain services analogously to the situation for the r
import of services. A second is Argentinian product pertinent be- C
cause more tourists visiting Chile have come from neighboring Argentina than e
anywhere else and that tourism is income sensitive. A third is the LAFTA t
dummy variable, which suggests that the formation of that organization re-
sulted in increased regional tourism in the early 1960s.
iv. The significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable implies t
the dominance of an inventory effect for services. Although the existence of an
inventory effect for service exports such as for tourists from neighboring coun-
I
tries does not seem unreasonable, the absolute magnitude of this coefficient is
surprisingly large. The explanation probably is that the series for the dependent
1
variable better reflects the payment for services (for which an inventory effect 1
makes more sense) than the provision of services. Lags in payments also
underlie the significance of the lagged trade term (X + M)1 in addition to
the current one.
CHILEAN NET FACTOR INCOME FROM ABROAD.
Relation 8.3 is for Chilean net factor income from abroad in constant
terms (NFIAB/PGDP), where PGDP denotes the GDP deflator:
NFIAB
=26.5V1—0.840V2—0.116V3 +0.377V4 —376 (8.3) r
PGDP (2.1) (2.2) (3.0) (1.8)(5.6)
[—0.8] [0.4] [0.4] [—0.7]
R2 =0.81;SE =31.4;DW =1.7;years covered, 1947—65
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where
V1 =realwage rate in mining including employers' social security tax
contributions;
V2 =dollarvalue of mining exports after adjustment for direct tax on
large-scale mining relative to dollar cost of intermediate mining in-
puts at special NER for large-scale mining;
V3 =exportvalue after adjustment for direct tax on large-scale mining
relative to intermediate input index for mining with adjustment for
ratio of national accounts to large-scale mining NERs (with all corn-
'2 ponents lagged one year);
V4 =realvalue of legal cost of production for large-scale mining at large-
scale mining NER (with all components lagged one year).
Jfic
Chilean net factor income from abroad (NF1AB) is composed primanly of
outflows from mining. The primary determinants of this flow are variables re-
for
' latedto that sector: the prices of mining inputs (labor and intermediate), the
real level of total or of mining exports, the price of mining products (or of
copper in particular), the legal cost of production in large-scale mining, the
an employers' social security tax rate and the direct tax rate on large-scale mining,
rA the NER for large-scale mining, and possibly quantitative restrictions. This
re- relationship is a somewhat ad hoc attempt to estimate the determinants of real
factor income from abroad in response to composite variables constructed on
tes the basis of such considerations.
an These factors are consistent with a considerable portion of the variance
in the dependent variable. The coefficients are of the anticipated signs. Judging
is
i fromthe t statistics and the elasticities, government policies regarding the
NER, the legal cost of production, and the tax rates for large-scale mining
played particularly important direct roles in determining variations in net factor
payments from abroad.
to Quantitative restrictions,6 on the other hand, were not important because
the Chilean government never limited the freedom of the large-scale mining
companies to repatriate after-tax earnings as they saw fit. In fact, the com-
panies were not required either to return such earnings to Chile or to convert
them into escudos.
nt Finally, relation 8.3 supports the observation that the Chilean govern-
ments wished to limit factor payments abroad and were reluctant, therefore, to
increase the PLD-NER for large-scale mining. The export estimate for large-
1) scale mining in Table 7.2, however, implies that the limiting of foreign factor
payments from this subsector was purchased at the price of reduced national
• control over foreign exchange from exports. It is not clear that the government
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8.1.4General-Equilibrium Responses of Services.
The model introduced in Chapter 2 and the simulations summarized in
Table A.!! once again provide the basis for commentary on the responses of
services within a general-equilibrium framework. d
The general-equilibrium responses of service imports and exports to
exchange-rate variations show the same basic characteristic as do most other
exports and imports (subsections 6.2.2 and 7.2.2). Most of the large partial-
equilibrium reactions are swamped by indirect effects resulting especially from d
domestic price responses to changes in international reserves. As a result, the
relevant first-year elasticities are about 0.1 in absolute value (simulation a
2.1.1). Note that the elasticity for service exports is about the same in absolute
magnitude as for service imports despite the partial-equilibrium differences
observed in the previous subsection.7 Pessimism about the effectiveness of
exchange-rate policy seems appropriate for the service categories as well
as for the goods categories. t'
The response of net factor income from abroad to changes in the over-all
exchange rate is inverse and elastic in the first year, with a fairly substantial re-
action occurring during the next several years (simulations 2.1.1 and 2.l.3).8
The first-year elasticity for a change in the NER for large-scale mining alone is
—0.9 (simulation 2.7.1). The general-equilibrium results thus reinforce the
partial-equilibrium conclusion that the low NER for domestic purchases of
large-scale mining significantly reduced foreign-factor earnings.
The general-equilibrium responses of services to changes in quantitative
restrictions are quite large (simulation 2.3.1). The first-year elasticity of —0.9
for service exports is greater in absolute value than those for all but one other
export category. The first-year elasticity of —4.6 for service imports is the
largest in absolute value among all import categories.9 The first-year elasticity
for net factor income from abroad is —4.0, and the third-year one is —5.8.
These results suggest that quantitative restrictions affect service imports
more strongly than any other category; for balance-of-payments constraint of
services, quantitative restrictions are more effective than price-related measures
unless the impact on domestic prices of the latter can be largely neutralized;
QRs are also quite effective in restraining factor payments abroad despite the
lack of evidence of any significant partial-equilibrium response (subsection
8.1.3).
• 8.2 CAPITAL AND GOLD FLOWS
The sum of movements in the merchandise, service, and transfer accounts, of
course, were offset by flows in the capital and gold accounts (except for the
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relatively small error and omissions item). The mean net inflows on the capital
and gold accounts were positive in all the post-World War II phases and sub-
in phases (line C in Table 8. l).b0 Thus Chile was consistently a debtor nation.11
Variations in these means were not obviously primarily associated with
degrees of liberalization or of restrictiveness. They rose in the more liberal
to phases of 1956—58 and 1959—61 and also in the more restrictive phases of
1962—64 and 197 1—73. They fell in the more liberal phase of 1965—70 and the
jal- more restrictive subphase of 1952—55. Although these patterns in some ways
om directly reflected the nature of the regime (see below), of much greater im-
the portance was the situation in the world copper market and the general avail-
ability of foreign loans.
'ute
8.2.1Net Capital Flows to the Nonmonetary Sectors.
Le11 Total net capital inflows to the nonmonetary sectors, in contrast to those
to all sectors, clearly have been associated with the degree of liberalization.
balI Means increased for each of the three more liberal phases and decreased for
re- more restrictive phases and subphases (with the single exception of 1962—64).
)
.8 Theratio of these flows to all capital and monetary-gold movements rose in
is each more liberal phase and fell in each more restrictive one (although not in
the the 1952—55 subphase). Consideration of the four major components of the
of net capital flows to nonmonetary sectors facilitates understanding of these pat-
terns.
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT FLOWS.
The most striking phase associations were in net direct investment (Table
• 8.1, line 10), which increased in each more liberal phase and decreased in each
more restrictive one. The lags in these changes, moreover, were quite small; so
the indicated movement generally was reached in the first year of each phase.12
rts This association of net direct investment inflows with phases partially re-
of flects a similar pattern for the substantial share of these inflows going to large-
res scale mining. As is discussed in subsection 7.1.2.3, the Nuevo Trato of 1955
ki; and the Frei Chileanization and nationalization programs of 1967—69 shaped p
he much of the latter flow.'3
Dii In recent phases major total net direct investment inflows have been going
to subsectors other than large-scale mining (line 10 less line 10.1). These
flows, too, responded to specific policies which eased or restricted capital entry
and subsequent repatriation (subsection 4.3.2). 01 even more importance than
• such specific policies, however, apparently was the perception of a "favorable
investment climate" caused by the over-all program of stabilization plus lib-
•)f eralization.
Larger net direct investment inflows by themselves did not guarantee that
ILTm
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the total direct impact of liberalization policies was to increase the net short-
term command over foreign exchange related to direct investment.14 Such
policy changes also generally allowed larger net outflows of income from direct
investments (Table 8.1, line 5.1). In fact, however, for all but one of the recent
phases, the short-term command over foreign exchange rose in liberalization
and fell in more restrictive periods even when both of these flows are taken into
account.
The single exception was the Frei liberalization. For those years the mean
net outflow with both factors taken into account rose more than 50 per cent
over that of the previous phase. Most of this increased net outflow, however,
only reflected the sharp shift in the composition of capital inflows to large-scale
mining from direct investment to long-term loans, which was caused by the
Chileanization and nationalization programs.
The ratio between net direct investment inflows and net income on direct
investment outflows is also revealing. This ratio increased in each liberaliza-
tion phase (including the Frei one) and fell in each more restrictive phase.
Only during the 1956—58 and 1959—61 liberalizations in fact did this ratio ex-
ceed one-half (the values were 0.75 and 0.96, respectively). The implied large
excess of outflows over inflows related to direct investment, of course, does not
prove that Chile did not gain significantly from these investments. That this
ratio averaged only 0.30 for 1947—69, however, caused many Chileans to ques-
tion the appropriateness of the distribution of the gains from direct foreign in-
vestment.
The Allende government therefore attempted to establish a more desirable
distribution of the benefits from direct foreign investment and greater Chilean
control over operations.'5 A number of existing foreign firms and some new
ones agreed to continue or expand production, often with minority participa-
tion in mixed enterprises and with state-guaranteed minimum rates of net re-
turn of 5 per cent (e.g., RCA International, General Tire, FEMSA, General
Electric, Gillette, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Pfizer, Renault, Citroen, Pe-
gasso, and Fiat). Others, however, terminated their Chilean operations on
terms apparently more or less satisfactory to the foreign owners, at least given
their expectations about future developments there (e.g., the Bank of America,
Northern Indiana Brass, Purina, First National City Bank, Dow Chemical, and
du Pont). A few, the largest of which were International Telephone and Tele-
graph and Ford, had acrimonious interactions with the Chilean government
concerning operations and compensation.16 The over-all result was a large net
direct investment outflow. This contrasted with most earlier phases (although
not with 1962—64) and contributed to the drop of $188.8 million in autono-
mous capital movements between 1970 and 1971.
Other private long-term investment movements were not particularly
phase-associated (Table 8.1, line 11). Mean net inflows rose in each of the
a'
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I phasesfor which data are available (but they almost certainly declined in the
1971—73 Phase II period, for which data are not yet available).'7 The largest
•t absolute positive increment, on the other hand, also was for a Phase II period
t (1962—64).
Due to the secular increase (at least until the end of the 1960s), net flows
from this source became substantially more important in the over-all net inflow
of capital and nonmonetary gold. In the 1950s, for example, this source aver-
ii aged 11 per cent of the total net inflow of capital and nonmonetary gold. In the
It I 960s it accounted for 37 per cent.
This level of aggregation, however, does conceal one important change
•Ic which occurred in the late 1960s. Because of the Frei Chileanization and na-
e tionalization programs for large-scale mining, substantial long-term private
• loans were made to that subsector starting in 1967. Such inflows accounted for
t 80 per cent of net other long-term private capital movements in 1965—69,
- althoughthey had been insignificant earlier because capital inflows to this
subsector previously had been in the form of direct investment. Thus, under-
lying the aggregate increase in this phase was a substantial drop in net inflows
.' other than to large-scale mining. Therefore, this liberalization really resulted
more in a shift in composition than an increase in total private long-term capi-
is tal inflows.
For both these other long-term capital inflows and for direct investment,
I- outflows for income also must be considered in evaluating the total direct
impact on the balance of payments. The available data, unfortunately, do not
distinguish income on these other private long-term capital movements from
fl that on private short-term capital movements. However, a comparison can be
made between total other private inflows (Table 8.1, line 11 + line 12) and the
resulting outflows for income (line 5 less variable 5.1). In such a comparison
two features stand out:
i. The mean ratio of the former to the latter for 1947—69 is 0.89, which
is much higher than the comparable ratio for direct investment. Differences in
timing of the flows account for only a part of this discrepancy.18 Apparently
the more important factor was that direct investments were much more profit-
able from the point of view of foreigners than were these other inflows.
U ii. The over-all short-run impact of these other private capital movements,
in contrast to those for direct investments, was not increased control of foreign
exchange in periods of liberalization and vice versa in restrictive periods. In
t fact, for all recent phases for which data are available, except the 1959—6 1
liberalization, the pattern is the opposite.
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENT FLOWS
Other private short-term capital flows may be very volatile in a country
with a history of inflation and foreign-sector policy like Chile's. The repeated
-_________r
p
212 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
pattern of maintaining the NERfrxedand then devaluing substantially to a new
fixed level was a strong inducement for speculative short-term capital move- t
ments. The real rates of interest as seen by foreigners and by nationals often
diverged by large amounts, and both rates also varied greatly over time. After
a devaluation and while the NER remained unchanged, for example, the real
interest rate for foreigners was equal to the nominal rate. The latter, in turn,
was quite high because of internal inflation. As a result, the real return on
foreign loans probably exceeded their real product.
Mean net other private short-term capital inflows reflected the degree of
liberalization (Table 8.1, line 12). For each more liberal phase except 1956—
• 58 they increased.11' For each more restrictive phase or subphase they fell.
In the 1959—61 liberalization effort the special repatriation arrange-
•
ments and the establishment of dollar accounts induced part of the expanded
inflow. In the 1965—70 attempt, the sliding-peg NER apparently had the same
effect by reducing uncertainty about future PLD-NER variations and encour-
aging investment in export industries (but see note 19). In both of these phases
•- revisedexpectations about the over-all performance of the economy resulting
from the program of stabilization plus liberalization probably also contributed.
The gains in short-run control over foreign exchange helped to extend these
liberalization attempts. In neither case, of course, did such inflows offset the
effects of overvaluation. In the first case, moreover, the increasing real interest
rates for foreigners resulting from inflation in combination with the fixed NER
meantthat the real return on such loans probably exceeded their real product.
Under the Allende government short-term capital inflows dropped con-
siderably (although data comparable to those in Table 8.1 are not available).
This fall reflected speculation about NER movements, capital flight to avoid
nationalization and redistribution policies, and the cutting off of short-term
credits by many traditional suppliers in retaliation for the compensation
decision for. large-scale copper mining.20 This decline exacerbated an already
difficult foreign-exchange situation.
The annual data underlying Table 8.1 provide further information about
speculative movements of short-term capital. If speculation were successful
enlarged outflows would be expected in the last year of phases in anticipation
of devaluation. Countermovements in the first year of liberalization attempts
would reverse the process.
Only limited support for such patterns is found in the annual data for
• short-term capital inflows. They decreased in half of the last years of phases
and increased in only one-third of the first years of liberalization. If errors and
• omissions are also considered because they include unrecorded short-term
capital movements, however, the patterns were more consistent with those
hypothesized. In three-fourths of the last years of all phases, drops were re-
ported and in two-thirds of the first years of liberalizations increases were
I'
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recorded. If such a phenomenon prevailed, therefore,it operated largely
through unrecorded movements.2'
CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Net capital movements to the central government were not highly asso-
ciated with the degree of liberalization (Table 8.1, line 13). Mean ratios
decreased for two of the three liberalization efforts and rose very sharply in
the 1962—64 Phase II period. Annual ratios fell in the first year of two of three
liberalization attempts and increased in 1962.
Loans to the central government were the most important component of
total net capital movements to the government (Table 8.1, lines 13.1—13.5).
The pattern of the latter largely reflected movements in the former. The net ba-
d lance for these loans, in turn, reflected both supply and demand considerations.
e On the supply side the most dominant single factor was the Alliance for
Progress. In the 1960s the United States considered Chile to be an important
alternative to Castroism and militarism in Latin America. Therefore, the
g United States made available substantial capital funds. As a result, net loans
received by the central government expanded enormously in the early 1960s
e and remained at almost as high a level under the Frei regime.22 After Allende
e was elected, however, that support from the United States dried up quickly, al-
though it was partially replaced by new
Other fairly important supply factors were increased funds made available
in response to major earthquakes in 1939 and 1960 and in support of the three
stabilization efforts. The impact of these inflows, however, was much less than
that of those mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Demand factors included, first of all, the need for repayment of previous
debts. Owing to such repayments, for example, in 1956—58 outflows exceeded
inflows despite foreign support for the program of liberalization and stabiliza-
• lion. A second factor was the attempt to facilitate price stabilization by financ-
ing government deficits abroad during the stabilization programs. In each case
the plan was to utilize such measures only until the government deficit was
eliminated, but that plan was not realized.
Together these supply and demand factors resulted in great command
over foreign exchange from capital received by the government in the late
• 1940s and the 1960s. The net impact in the 1950s and early 1970s, however,
r was small or negative because of repayment requirements and the political
s views of potential donors.
a 8.2.2Net Capital andGoldFlows to the Monetary Sectors.
Net credits resulting from flows to and from the monetary sectors followed
e two patterns. Before 1965 the total and most of the components rose on the
Lp
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average for each liberalization effort and fell in each more restrictive phase gc
or subphase. During 1956—58 and 1959—61, for example, large increases in
net loans from stabilization funds and in the use of IMF credit offset the greater
deficits on the goods and services account (Table 8.1, lines A, 15.1, and 15.2).
These credits were critical for these liberalization efforts.24
But because of such credits, together with ones in the nonmonetary
sectors, foreign debts grew and foreign reserves shrank. During the 1956—58
phase total public-sector foreign debt increased 56 per cent to a level of $392
million, and net foreign reserves held by the system fell from $88.6
million to —$13.4 million. During the 1959—61 period total public-sector
foreign debt increased 101 per cent to a level of $788 million, total Chilean
debt in foreign currency 25rose82 per cent to a level of $954 million, and net
foreign-exchange reserves held by the banking system plummeted to —$164.8
million. The foreign debt in 1961 was. equal to 183 per cent of exports or 22
per cent of GDP. These liberalization attempts with an overvalued NER thus
had a definite cost in terms of the longer-run command over foreign exchange.
For the 1965—70 Phase III years and the Phase II period thereafter, the
previous pattern was in some important respects reversed. During 1965—70,
foreign exchange for expanded imports was available from enlarged export d
revenues and capital inflows to the nonmonetary sectors. As a result, net credit
0
frommonetary sectors fell from $24.9 million to —$74.2 million. Net interna-
tional reserves held by the banking system increased from $238.7 million at
the end of 1964 to over $300 million at the end of 1970. Foreign debt, how-
ever, grew from $1,896 million at the end of 1964 to over $3,000 million at the
end of 1970. At the end of the period this debt equaled about two and a half
years of exports and over a quarter of annual GDP.
In 1971, the Allende government introduced a more restrictive regime.
The enlarged deficit on current account and the sharp drop in credits from the
nonmonetary sectors nevertheless implied that compensatory capital move-
ments had to increase substantially. Between 1970 and 1971, in fact, they rose
by over $285 million. Additional credits from international organizations were
very limited, in part because of United States pressure. The net international
reserves of the banking system that had been accumulated in the previous phase
were quickly depleted. In addition large debt payments were due, in part be- 1•
causeof debt rescheduling in 1965. The combination of a decline in the world
copper price, the inability to exploit the expanded copper capacity, the unavail-
ability of capital from traditional sources, the inability to obtain sufficient capi-
tal from new sources (e.g., the Socialist nations), and the large foreign debt all
led to a foreign-exchange crisis. As is described in subsection 4.3.3, at the end
of 1971 Chile stopped payment on her foreign debt and asked for renegotiation
of these obligations. In 1972 some relief was provided by the debtors, but the
foreign-exchange shortage continued to pinch the economy. When the AllendeOTHER COMPONENTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 215





58 1. Given that the black market has been used more for nongoods than for goods
•92 transactions, the changes inthe mean PLD-NER for that market provides further
evidence of this pattern (line 1.1.3 in Table Al).
2. Some of the variance originated in exports of services. For example, in 1972
:or exports of services to visitors rose substantially because of attractive bargains for tourists
an dealing in the black market and because UNCTAD III was held in Santiago in April.
3. The coefficient of variation (i.e., the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean)
• of the secular time trend for service imports for 1947—65 was 0.30; for service exports,
it was 0.20. Among all import categories a higher ratio was reached only for transporta-
r tion-relatedinvestment goods. Among all export categories, in contrast, higher ratios
than those for service exports were experienced in all cases except for large-scale mining.
4. The estimates in Table A.2 suggest that the rate of growth of both exports and
be imports of services declined in the first year of liberalization attempts and that the
.' formerdeclined more than the latter. This result probably reflects the extensive depen-
dence of service exports on total imports, which also felt significantly in the first year
of liberalization efforts.
•lit 5. For the sample period the PLD-EER and PLD-NER for services are almost
a- identical. For 1956—70 the former fell 46 per cent and the latter, 52 per cent (column 12
•at in Table 3.2 and column 2 in Table 5.1).
6. That is, quantitative restrictions beyond those which limited large-scale mining
to a special NER for currency to pay for domestic inputs.
7. For the larger deviations to the Bacha-Taylor equilibrium values (simulation
2.1.3), however, the absolute value of the first-year deviation is larger for imports than
for exports, although the discrepancy stillis not as great as the partial-equilibrium
e. estimatemight suggest.
8. The relatively large elasticities, however, may reflect in part the fact that this
e variable is the difference between two flows. See note a to Table A.1I.
• 9. By the third year, however, the response to a one-time change reverses in sign.
10. They were positive, in fact, in all but three years (1954, 1955, and 1969) when
copper-export booms were unusually important.
al 11. The data line of 1.2.6.5 of Table A.! suggest that Chile also was a substantial
debtor nation during the decades before the Great Depression. In most years external
public foreign debt exceeded ordinary government income or total export value.
Data consistent with those in Table 8.1 are not available for the 1930s. The piece-
meal evidence extant, however, indicates that capital movements plummeted to almost
nothing in the early 1930s and recovered slowly thereafter. Baerresen [1966:2], for
example, reports that the foreign investment inflow was $232 million in1930, $16
ft million in 1931, and effectively zero in 1932. Marshall [1957:51] claims that foreign
• loans contracted to the government in the same three years were $85 million, $3 million,
and zero. According to Senado, Oficina de Inforrnaciones [1971:48, 54], finally, in no
year in the 1931—46 period did direct gross investment in large-scale mining (the
dominant destination for foreign investment inthe previous two decades) exceed
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12. The only exception was in the 1965—70 liberalization phase, when an increase
did not occur until the second year of the phase.
13. Somewhat earlier, the introduction of more favorable NERs for the domestic
cost of investment in large-scale mining in 1948 and 1950 also coincided with substantial
expansion in capacity at Chuquicamata, Chile's largest copper mine. However, Mikesell
[1971:370—371] maintains that this investment would have occurred without this policy
change because Anaconda long had been concerned about maintaining its13—14 per
cent long-run share of world copper production—and 70 per cent of Anaconda's output
came from its Chilean mine.
14. In addition to that direct impact, of course, direct investment caused other
changes in the balance of payments indirectly through effects on imports and exports.
15. This paragraph is focused on foreign investments other than in large-scale min-
ing (On the latter, see subsection 7.1.2.3, above). Szulc [1970:2] reports that such invest-
ments from the United States totaled over $400 million at the time of Allende's election.
According to Picks' [1965:1211, six years earlier direct investments of other foreigners
totaled more than $300 million.
16. In 1967 ITT agreed to sell up to 49 per cent of its common stock in its Chilean
Telephone subsidiary to Chileans and to the Chilean government with the added stipula-
tion that Chile could purchase the entire system in 1980. By early 1971, 30 per cent
control of the subsidiary lay in Chilean hands, but the government wished to include this
operation in the state area of control; long negotiations for nationalization were therefore
initiated. On September 15, 1971, ITT was informed that it would be nationalized, but
discussions continued over the terms of compensation for what ITT claimed was a $153
million investment. In March 1972 relations between ITI' and the Chilean government
were severely strained by the charge of Jack Anderson in his syndicated column that ITT
had been attempting to prevent the inauguration of President-elect Allende in the fall of
1970. As one result ITT was not compensated for its former Chilean holdings. For de-
tails as reported in United States newspapers, see Anderson [1972a, 1972b], de Onis
[l97ld, 1972e], Hammer [1972], Jensen [19711, New York Times [l972a, 1972b], Phila-
delphia EveningBulletin [1972],Szulc [19721, and Welles [l972b].
17. Regular patterns of a type did occur, however, within phases. In every case
(except for 1956) during the first year of a phase net other long-term capital inflows
fell. In every phase they also rose in the last year.
18. The other inflows were relatively concentrated near the end of the period, thereby
increasing this ratio, ceteris paribus.
19. Errors and omissions may consist primarily of unrecorded short-term move-
ments. Net errors and omissions plus recordeçl net short-term capital movements rose in
1956—58, but not in 1965—69.
20. For example, according to a speech of July 1972 by Minister of Finance Or-
lando Millas, short-term credit lines from United States banks had been reduced from
$220 million to $32 million, a decline which had been only partially offset by increased
short-term credit from Japan and from European banks. The Chilean government
claimed that this drop reflected implementation of a policy of financial blockade imposed
by the United States. Anibal Palma, the Chilean Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, so
described United States actions and pressures on the IBRD and 1DB in his address of
April 14, 1972, before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in
Washington, as did Allende in his address to UNCTAD III in Santiago the previous day
and also in his subsequent 1972 May Day address. Also see Welles [1972a].
21. Picks' [1955:59; 1965:121; and 1970:129] gives evidence of quite large capital
movements which he speculates occurred in substantial part through black markets. The
AOTHER COMPONENTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 217
tase PLD-NERfor this market also reflects strong phase associations (line 1.1.3 of Table
A.!).
22. Contrary to widespread impressions, United States [1960—70] reports that mean
ttial annual aid flows from the United States did not increase during the Frei period, but in-
sell stead dropped by 20 per cent as compared to the previous phase. The average terms of
[icy such loans also became somewhat less favorable.
per 23. The United States long had used credits and loans to attempt to shape Chilean
put policies. For example, Cohen [1960:151 suggests that credits from the Export-Import Bank
and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs were used by the United States to put pres-
sure on Chile to break relations with Germany during the Second World War. Also
Moran [1970:58—59, 65—69] relates the following events: Early in his term President
am- Gonzalez sent the Pedregal Mission to Washington to renegotiate the Chilean foreign
est- debt and to arrange new credits. The mission met with less than complete success, how-
ion, ever, and was advised that Chile should treat the United States—owned large mining
companies better. Subsequently, in 1948, after the passage of the Law for the Defense of
Democracy which banned the Chilean Communist party (three members of which had
been in the first cabinet of President Gonzalez, a situation about which the United States
had expressed open concern), Export-Import Bank credits were increased substantially.
tent As a result net loans to the central government for 1947—5 1 also rose to a level that was
this exceeded only in the 1960s.
tore 24. It is interesting to note that the large increase in the use of these credits came
but not in the first year of the liberalization attempt, but thereafter. This suggests that they
153 were not used to counter initial speculation about the seriousness of the liberalization at-
.ent tempt. Instead, they prolonged the maintenance of the overvalued NERs.
IT 25. This figure does not include direct private credits or deferred payment import
•of credits because data are not available for these items.
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